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in that it is alleged that the court erroneously construed a legal
agreement.
5.
allow

Did the trial court err in requiring the Homeowners to

Foothills

to

transport

water

through

their

system

to

customers outside of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I; and is
this issue properly before the court on appeal?

The standard of

review is a legal correctness standard.
6. Should the lower court's initial determination that title
should be quieted in favor of Homeowners be upheld on appeal and
the case remanded with instructions to enter a quiet title order in
favor of Homeowners?

This issue is a question of law and should be

reviewed on a legal correctness standard.
7.

Does the record in the lower court support the District

Court's judgment quieting title in favor of Foothills? Again, this
should be reviewed from a legal correctness standard.
8.

Did the lower court err in dismissing Foothills' claims

for slander of title?

Since this involves questions of fact, the

standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard.
9.
Homeowners

Should

Bagleys have been

amounts allegedly

entitled

to recover

expended by Bagleys

from

for capital

improvements and losses incurred in operating the water system
where they transferred and assigned all right, title and interest

2

in the water system to J. Rodney Dansie? The standard of review is
a legal correctness standard.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal
is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title in a water system and water
right brought by Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association

(hereinafter

"Homeowners").

On October 20, 1989, the

Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District Court, entered an "Order on
Ownership Issues" in which he found among other things, "Plaintiff
(Homeowners) is the legal owner of the disputed water system, which
includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks and the
water lines."
Judge Brian also provided in that same Order for, "(A)n
evidentiary hearing. . . to establish the amount of reimbursement
due to Defendants Bagley & Company and/or Foothills Water Company
for the reasonable value of improvements made by Defendant Bagley
& Company."

Furthermore, Judge Brian ordered:

"An order quieting title to the water system,
in the name of plaintiff, will issue only upon
payment in full by plaintiff to defendant of
the Court's Reimbursement Order for improvements by the defendant to the plaintiff's
water system for the years 1974 to 1985."
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On August 16, 1990, Judge Brian ruled among other things, that
a certain well lease agreement was a valid encumbrance upon the
subject water system and required the Appellant Homeowners, who he
found to be the owner of the water system, to permit Appellee J.
Rodney Dansie's family to receive and transport free of charge,
water through the subject system, in the amount of twelve million
gallons per year or such larger amount as would be permitted by the
excess capacity of the system as long as the system exists and is
operative.
The Court ordered Plaintiff and Appellant herein to pay to
Foothills Water Company the sum of $98,500.00 before it would enter
the Quiet Title Order to the water system and water right in favor
of Appellant no later than August 15, 1991, with the unpaid balance
being interest free.
On February 5, 1991, the Court issued a ruling entitled "Order
on Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarification of Order".
In this Order, Judge Brian amended his previous Order without
formal motion in writing or on the record by any party, and
provided that a Quiet Title Order would issue to Foothills if
Homeowners failed to pay Foothills $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991.
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by Foothills that the
$98,500.00 had not been paid to them as provided, the Court issued
a Quiet Title Order in favor of Foothills Water Company, despite
4

its previous ruling that the water system was legally owned by the
Homeowners.
Homeowners seeks reversal of the Court's issuance of the Quiet
Title Order in the name of Foothills Water Company; and reversal of
the determination of the Court that Appellant should have been
required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 to Appellee Foothills Water
Company as a condition precedent to being issued its own Quiet
Title Order in the case. Homeowners seek an order from this Court
requiring the trial court to issue a Quiet Title Order to the
disputed property in its name, without the encumbrances contained
in its final Order below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On March 8, 1985, the Homeowners filed the instant action
(R. 2-17).

As the issues clarified, and additional procedural

matters were considered by the parties and the Court, Homeowners
subsequently (March 16, 1987) filed a Second Amended Complaint
asking the Court to quiet title and/or issue a declaratory judgment
declaring the rights and responsibilities of Homeowners with
respect to ownership of the water system, and the real estate
related thereto, which serves Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase
I (R. 296-304). Homeowners also requested that liens filed against
the system by Appellee J. Rodney Dansie be removed and declared
null and void.

5

2.

Appellees

Bagley

and Bagley

& Company

(hereinafter

collectively "Bagley") answered the Second Amended Complaint on
March 31, 1987, claiming that the Homeowners had not paid bills for
water usage in their First Cause of Action; and claiming that if
Appellant is found to be the owner of the water system, Bagley
should be reimbursed for costs and expenses in the operation and
maintenance of the system (R. 317-322).
3.

Appellees Foothills Water Company (hereinafter "Foot-

hills") and Dansie answered Homeowners1 Second Amended Complaint on
March 21, 1987, and counterclaimed against Counter-Claim Defendants
Sims and Turner for slander of title and against Homeowners to
quiet title in the action in Foothills Water Company.

Dansie and

Foothills also filed a Cross-Claim against Defendants Spencer and
Lewton for slander of title (R. 341-352).
4. By stipulated Order dated June 11, 1987, the Honorable Pat
B. Brian found that all parties necessary to the action were named
in the Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim (R. 365-367).
5.

Homeowners replied to the Dansie and Foothills Counter-

claims on July 9, 1987 (R. 371-373).
6.

Counterclaim

Defendants

Sims and Turner

replied to

Foothills and Dansiefs Counterclaim on July 9, 1987 (R. 374-377).
Ultimately Foothills and Dansie abandoned their claim against Sims
and Turner and this appeal does not concern them.
6

7. Defendants Spencer and Lewton answered Appellant's Second
Amended Complaint and Foothills' Cross-Claim on July 13, 1987 (R.
381-384)•

In their answer, Defendants Spencer and Lewton claimed

no interest in the property detailed in Plaintiff's Complaint and
stated they had no contract or transaction with Foothills that
would give rise to a cross-claim against them (R. 381-384).
8.

Charles E. Lewton and Keith Spencer, two of the original

developers of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, having chosen
to disclaim their interest in any of the property involved, allowed
judgment to be taken against them.

(R. 897, 902, 904). The same

was true of Defendants Hi-Country Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country
Estates Second (R. 897, 902, 903).

Defendant J. Rodney Dansie

failed to appeal from any of the Court's Orders in this case. All
unknown

persons

claiming

an

interest

in

Hi-Country

Estates

Subdivision were served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of
Summons by Publication entered on March 23, 1987, by the Honorable
David B. Dee (R. 312, 313). Proof of Publication was presented to
the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Therefore, the only
parties against whom title was not quieted in this case were
Foothills Water Company, Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley & Company, who
have cross-appealed in this matter.
9.

Trial began on August 25, 1988.

7

On that date, the Court

entered a Minute Entry stating:
"This matter comes on before the Court for
trial, with appearances as shown above. The
Plaintiff's and Defendants1 counsel meet with
the Court in chambers, and opening remarks are
therefore waived.
Thereupon, the Plaintiff
calls Marge Tempest and she is sworn and
examined. The respective counsel then agreed
to submit the matter via written proffer. The
matter will be further argued on September 9,
1988, at 1:00 p.m." (Emphasis supplied).
(R. 452).
10.

The Court thereupon received from the parties a "Stipu-

lated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions" (R.
565-596, 1661-1866), proffers of the parties, and legal briefs.
11.

On October 25, 1988, the Court brought the parties

together to announce its decision on the issue of ownership.

(As

of April 1, 1992, the transcript of this proceeding had not been
transferred to the Supreme Court and made a part of the record in
this appeal. However, on March 30, 1992, Plaintiff notified Judge
Brian's reporter, Brad J. Young, of this oversight, since transcripts of all proceedings have previously been ordered as part of
the record by the parties.

Mr. Young promised to transfer the

missing transcript to the Supreme Court, but had not done so as of
the date of this brief.

However, Appellant's counsel is in

possession of a copy of the transcript of the proceedings referred
to on August 25, 1988, which is attached as Addendum 4 to this
Brief, and refers to page numbers in said transcript in this brief).
8

12.

Present counsel entered his appearance for Homeowners on

August 18, 1989 (R. 864-865).
13.

The Court's decision of August 25, 1988, was embodied in

an "Order on Ownership Issues" signed by Judge Brian on October 20,
1989 (R. 895-898). At that time, the Court also signed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 899-904).

Appellant does not

appeal from this Order or from these Findings of Facts or Conclusions of Law, except to the extent a Quiet Title Order was made
contingent upon the payment of money.
14. Claiming they were denied due process in the trial of the
matter (despite the fact they had stipulated to the procedure used
by the Court), Dansie and Foothills moved the Court for an Order of
Reconsideration on October 30, 1989, as well as filing a motion for
a new trial and for amendment/modification of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order entered October 20, 1989 (R. 906-908).
15.

On December 1, 1989, Homeowners filed a "Trial Brief and

Motion for Summary Judgment on Valuation Issue", claiming that the
Court was bound

by the determination

of the

Public

Service

Commission of Utah as to the improvements to the subject water
system between 1974 and 1985 (R. 1023-1043).
16. The Court heard Dansie and Foothills' motions on December
28, 1989, and issued an Order denying all motions and restating
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that the "Order dated October 20, 1989 is the final Order of the
Court" on ownership issues (R. 1166).
17. On January 8, 1990, Foothills and Dansie filed a "Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration or for Amendment/Modification of
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order", in which Appellees
argued that the Court's previous "Order on Ownership Issues" dated
October 20, 1989, should be amended to provide something different
than a requirement for reimbursement by Appellant to Dansie and/or
Bagley & Company for the value of improvements to the system made
between 1974 and 1985, i.e. reimbursement for the entire cost of
the system (R. 1169-1201).
18. On January 17, 1990, the Court reiterated its prior Order
for the third time in its "Order Re: Further Proceedings" by
ruling:
"1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order entered by this Court on October
20, 1989, which memorialize the Court's previous oral ruling on October 25, 1988, reflect
the Court's current Order dealing with the
issues expressly ruled upon therein. . ."
(R. 1205-1210).
19.

By Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, Foothills and

Dansie's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial, and
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were
denied for a second time (R. 1228).

10

20.

In the same Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, the Court

denied Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
valuation issue and scheduled a trial to "determine fair compensation" (R. 1228).
21. Trial was held on the valuation issue on July 30, 31, and
August 1, 1990 (R. 1358-1362; R. 1953-2404).
22.

On August 16, 1990, the Court issued its Memorandum

Decision (R. 1538-1543), which was embodied in formal Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and "Order Regarding Amount Payable by
Plaintiff for Subject Water System" dated October 31, 1990 (R.
1620-1628).
23. On September 10, 1990, Foothills and Dansie made a Motion
to Certify Orders as Final, and for Stay Pending Appeal (R. 15571559).

Appellees Bagley also made a Motion to Certify the Court's

Order as Final on September 21, 1990 (R. 1584-1585).
24.

Despite the fact that no certification of the Court's

Order for appeal had been signed by the trial judge, Bagley and
Foothills filed appeals with the Utah Supreme Court which ultimately were dismissed on June 19, 1991, without prejudice to the filing
of a new appeal (R. 1893-Supreme Court No. 900447) and July 25,
1991 (R. 1918-Supreme Court No. 910115).
25. On October 31, 1990, the parties were notified that Judge
Brian desired to have an "informal conference" with them regarding
11

Appellees' Motions to Certify Orders as Final with but a few hours
notice.

On October 31, 1990, at 11:30 a.m., the parties appeared

expecting this "informal conference".
26.

At that time, and not on the record, despite a request

for the matter to be on the record by the parties, Judge Brian
granted the oral motion of Foothills and Bagley to amend its
previous Order dated October 31, 1990, with a ruling that if
Homeowners failed to pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991,
an Order Quieting Title to the water system would be entered in the
name of Foothills Water Company (R. 1647).
27.

On February 5, 1991, the trial judge signed the document

entitled "Order on Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarification of Order" in which he ruled among other things:
"If the sum of $98,500.00 required to be paid
to Foothills Water Company in paragraph 3 of
the Order Regarding Amount Payable by Plaintiff for subject water system, dated October
31, 1990, is not paid in full to Foothills
Water Company on or before August 15, 1991, an
Order Quieting Title to the water system
within the boundaries of Hi-Country Estates
Subdivision Phase I and the water right represented by Application No. 33130 (59-1608) on
file with the Utah State Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Water Rights, and the
Utah State Engineer's Office, in Foothills
Water Company shall be entered forthwith."
(R. 1647-1649).
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28.

On May 23, 1991, Homeowners filed a "Motion to Pay

$98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account Under Control of the
Court" (R. 1870-1882).
29.

Foothills and Dansie opposed the Motion (R. 1883-1889).

30.

The Court granted Homeowners' Motion in a telephone

conference on July 23, 1991 (R. 1895) (a transcript of which was
stipulated to by the parties) (R. 1902-1907).
Homeowners1

However, despite

objections, the Court, during this same telephone

conference, refused to enter an order indicating the $98,500.00 was
to be returned to Homeowners if the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's Quiet Title Order to be entered in Homeowners' name.
31.

Instead, the Court signed Foothills' "Order Regarding

Payment of the Sum of $98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account
Under Control of the Court" which provided inter alia:
"In the event an appeal of this matter is
prosecuted through final resolution, such
money shall continued to be held by the Court
and the Court will consider on proper motion
how to dispose of that money and whether any
part or all of that money will be payable to
Foothills or any other party as a result of
damage claims, claims for unreimbursed costs
or extraordinary expenses incurred as a result
of Foothills' operation of the subject system
during the pendency of the appeal of this
matter, or any other claims with respect
thereto."
(R. 1914-1917 at 1916).

13

32. Homeowners found this to be an intolerable condition, and
chose not to risk its money to be used to satisfy potential
frivolous claims by Foothills in the event of an unsuccessful
appeal.
33.

On August 16, 1991, Foothills filed a "Motion for Entry

of Order Quieting Title in favor of Foothills Water Company" (R.
1923).

On August 20, 1991, Judge Brian issued his "Quiet Title

Order in Favor of Foothills Water Company", finding that Homeowners
had failed to pay the $98,500.00 on or before August 15, 1991, as
required by his Order of October 31, 1990 (R. 1931-1936).
34. On August 22, 1991, Homeowners filed its Notice of Appeal
in this matter (R. 1944-46).
35. Foothills filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal in this matter
on September

18, 1991 (R. 1947-48).

It is significant that

Defendant J. Rodney Dansie does not appeal from any of the Court's
Orders in this case (R. 1947-48).
36.

On September 18, 1991, Bagley & Company and Gerald H.

Bagley filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter (R. 1950-51).
l

1

Homeowners would ask this Court to note that the 36
points in the above Statement of Facts were initially presented in
its Appellant's Brief. Although Appellees Bagley and Foothills
provided their own statement of facts, said statement of facts do
not conflict with any of the numbered paragraphs in Homeowners'
original statement of facts, but simply add additional facts that
Homeowners had not deemed important enough to present or which will
14

RESPONSE TO APPELLEE FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

its

"Consolidated

Initial

Brief

of

Foothills

Water

Company," Foothills provides some additional facts to the Court
with regard to this matter.

Since Foothills is alleging in its

Consolidated Initial Brief that the lower court's record supports
its judgment quieting title in favor of Foothills, Homeowners wish
to respond to Foothills' Statement of Facts as follows:
1.

The parties stipulated and agreed that Homeowners is a

Utah corporation in good standing and that its "shareholders" or
"members"

are owners of lots within the Subdivision

in the

southwestern part of Salt Lake County known as Hi-Country Estates,
Phase I (the "Subdivision") (R.567).
2.

Defendant Bagley & Company is not, in fact, a Utah

corporation.

It was at one time a general partnership and now is

simply a name used to identify Dr. Gerald Bagley's collective
enterprises. Likewise, the name "Bagley Enterprises" has been used
to identify Dr. Bagley's collective enterprises (R.568).
3.

The Subdivision plat contains an "Owners Dedication,"

be commented upon infra. Therefore, it is significant for the
Court to note that the 36 paragraphs in Homeowners' initial
Statement of Facts has not been disputed nor objected to by either
Appellee in this matter, and therefore may be taken as true by this
Court.
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which provides in relevant part as follows:
Know all men by these presents that we, the
three undersigned owners of the hereon
described tract of land, having caused same to
be subdivided into lots, rights-of-way and
streets to be hereafter known as Hi-Country
Estates, a Subdivision, do hereby dedicate for
perpetual use of the lot owners herein all
parcels of land shown on this plat as intended
for use as road right-of-way and bridle paths
except those parcels of land shown on this
plat as intended for public use. Use of lots
shall be subject to the Hi-Country Estates
Protective Covenants.
We do also hereby dedicate for the perpetual
use of the public all parcels of land shown in
parcel "A" as intended for public use.
(R.571).
4. While Foothills and Bagleys argue that Mr. Spencer and Mr.
Lewton entered into two agreements with Dr. Bagley by which certain
property was sold by Hi-Country Estates II to Bagley, Homeowners
dispute the 1974 agreement and contest its authenticity believing
that the document has been altered (R.1750-1758).

Stipulated

Exhibit HHH is a report of Grant J. Throckmorton, a judicially
recognized

disputed

(Addendum 1).

documents examiner

in the State of Utah

Mr. Throckmorton in his examination points out

numerous suspicious circumstances surrounding the copy of the
aforementioned document offered as an exhibit by Foothills.
include,

suspicious

conditions

following:

The critical sentence conveying the water system to
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but

are

not

limited

to

Such
the

Defendants was typed at a different time than the rest of the
document; four or five different typewriters were used on the
single document; pages were copied and/or reduced on different
copiers and several insertions and additions have been made to the
document.

The number and significance of the changes to the

document render it unacceptable and inadmissible as a copy (R.574).
5.

The parties

stipulated

in the

lower

court

in the

"Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions"
that "[I]n 1975, all ownership and assets, if any, of Hi-Country
Estates Water

Company

were transferred

to Dr. Bagley."

In

Foothills' Statement of Facts, Foothills leaves out the stipulated
words ". . .if any. . .".

Homeowners dispute the question as to

whether or not any ownership and assets were transferred to Dr.
Bagley in 1975 (R.574).
6. While Homeowners agree that Dr. Bagley entered into a well
lease and water transportation agreement in 1977 with Jesse Dansie
and used the well lease thereby, that well lease agreement expired
by its own terms on April 10, 1987, although Bagley did have the
right to renew the well lease on that date on terms to be agreed to
by Bagley and Dansie (R.1857-1867, at 1858).
7.

Although

Foothills

and Bagleys

claim

that

one Dee

Halverson appeared at the Assessor's Office and paid delinquent
taxes on behalf of Bagleys, a document entitled "Temporary Receipt
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No. 242" was found in the official records of the Salt Lake County
Treasurer. That document indicates the taxes were "received of HiCountry Estates Homeowners Assn." (R.579).
8. The County issued a tax deed in the name of the Homeowners
Association to the two water tank lots in dispute as part of the
water system in this case (R.579, 580).
9.
former

Although it is true that attorney Robert A. Bentley,
attorney

for

Homeowners,

entered

into

the

previously

mentioned "Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed
Contentions" which contained stipulated fact no. 79 stating, "The
Homeowners Association has never paid any amount to anyone to
expressly purchase the water system or the Glazier Well water
right" (emphasis supplied), Mr. Bentley also made clear on behalf
of the Homeowners in that very same document, that among the
disputed facts was the position taken by Homeowners that " [T]he
Homeowners paid valuable consideration for their interest in the
water system and the deed supporting that ownership through their
lot purchases, maintenance on the system, and payment of property
taxes" (R.588).

Therefore, the stipulated fact referred to by

Foothills in its brief must be viewed in light of the disputed fact
mentioned above.
10.

Although it is true that the claim of the Homeowners to

the water system complicated matters before the Public Service
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Commission in proceedings in January of 1986 (R.583, Appellant's
Foothills Consolidated Brief, p.18), the Public Service Commission
also made a specific finding as follows:
We find that all improvements to Foothills
prior to 1981 are not includable in rate base
because:
a. Bagley was selling lots at a profit until
1976.
b.
1980
part
made

The improvements made between 1977 and
were to have been provided by Bagley as
of the original system. For improvements
from 1981-1985, we find as follows:

1981: The pressure valve by lot no. 16
and the new air and vacuum valve and
check valve on booster station are
allowable in rate base. . .
1982: The new controls for tank no. 2
and new relay on booster station are
allowable in rate base. . .
1983: No costs allowable for rate base.
The 75 H.P. motor becomes Jesse Dansie's
property by the terms of the well lease
agreement. Insofar as the replacement
of the 600 foot section of main is
concerned, we find that Applicant failed
to demonstrate that the costs involved
in making that repair were just and
reasonable and that there is a valid
dispute as to the ownership of the main.
In addition, Bagley would have been
responsible to assure that the main was
in good condition before the system
would have been accepted by the
Conservancy District.
1984:

No improvements.
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1985: The replacement of booster pump,
starter control panel, new tank overflow
control
valves,
six-inch
metering
station and 1%-inch metering station are
allowable in rate base. The check valve
for the deep well is not allowable
because it becomes Jesse Dansie's
property by the terms of the well lease
agreement...
Thus, Applicants' total allowable rate base is
$16,334.99.
(R.1058-1059).
11.

Prior to 1987, a survey was performed which disputed the

original survey of the Subdivision and indicated that access to the
main water tank located

in Lot 67 was not possible without

traversing property owned by Gary A. and Carol W. Buhler, and that
the original tank was bisected by the property lines and sat in
part upon property owned by the Buhlers.

On or about June 12,

1987, the Buhlers quit-claimed to the Homeowners Association a
described portion of Lot 67, with the intention of giving to the
Association title to the ground upon which, according to the new
survey, a part of the tank sits and which is crossed by the access
road (R.585).
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ARGUMENT
POINT
THE FAILURE OF THE LOWER COURT TO MAKE SUPPORTING
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS FATAL
TO ITS QUIET TITLE ORDER IN FAVOR OF FOOTHILLS.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court.
It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
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(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment
accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
When findings of fact are made in actions
tried by the court without a jury, the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question
has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion
for a new trial.
(c)
Waiver of findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of
law may be waived by the parties to an issue
of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear
at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the
cause;
(3)
by oral consent in open court,
entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan.l, 1987.)
The seminal Utah case construing Rule 52 in the context of the
instant

matter

is Anderson

v. Utah

County

Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979).

Board

of

County

In that case, the Utah

Supreme Court clearly held that, with certain exceptions not
applicable to the instant matter, Rule 52(a) URCP " . . . must be
complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless there are findings
which will justify it." The Anderson court cited the earlier case
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of LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah.2d 260, 420
P.2d 615 (1966) and cases therein cited.
In LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, the Utah Supreme
Court reviewed a case where a trial court failed to make findings
of fact in denying relief to a plaintiff who sought to enforce an
alleged agreement to convey an interest in certain mining property
and to recover money advanced to defendants.

Justice Crockett,

writing for a unanimous court, made the following comments in
issuing the ruling of the court:
We are at a loss to understand why no findings
of fact were made in the instant case. The
right to resort to the courts for the
adjudication of grievances and the settlement
of disputes is a fundamental and important
one.
(Citing Article I, Section 11, Utah
Constitution, and Barnhart v. Civil Service
Employees Insurance Co., 16 Utah.2d 223, 398
P.2d 873 (1965)). An indispensable requisite
to fulfilling that responsibility is the
determination of questions of fact upon which
there is disagreement. It is for this reason
that our rules impose the duty of making
findings on all material issues. . . In Baker
v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 9, 257 P. 673, 676, the
court declared:
%

It is the duty of the trial court to
find upon all material issues raised by
the pleadings, and the failure to do so
is
reversible
error.
(Citing
authorities) (Emphasis supplied). . .'
420 P.2d at 616.
See also, Gaddis Investment Company v. Morrison, 278 P.2d 284
(1954); Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110; Prows v. Hawley,
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72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529;
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P.2d 292; Pike v. Clark,
95 Utah 235, 79 P.2d 1010.
It should be dispositive of this issue for the Court to note
that in the Consolidated Initial Brief of Foothills Water Company,
Appellee Foothills proclaims:

"Admittedly, the district court's

findings do not support its ultimate judgment."
Foothills W.C. at 27.

(Cons. In. Br. of

This admission alone should be sufficient

pursuant to the case authority cited under this Point for the Court
to reverse the quiet title order entered in favor of Foothills
Water Company and remand the case to the lower court for either
appropriate judgment in favor of Homeowners (which is supported by
all of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, memoranda and oral
opinions of the Court); or additional proceedings as the court
deems appropriate.
Although they admit the district court findings do not support
its judgment of quiet title in Foothills1 favor, Foothills' counsel
argues in its Consolidated Initial Brief that the district court
purported to resolve all fact issues related to ownership of the
water system and water right based upon a written stipulation and
written proffers, and that being the case, this appellate court is
in as good a position as was the district court to resolve those
issues.

(Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C. at p. 27).
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Foothills cites the case of Hamby v. Johnson,, 769 P.2d at 278
to support this proposition.

However, Hamby is a divorce case

decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in 1989.

A close reading of

the case finds no support whatsoever for the proposition alleged by
Foothills. However, on the page cited by Foothills, page 278, the
court notes that " . . . [B]oth parties stipulated to proffers of
testimony in front of Judge Harding, who encouraged the stipulation
by his remark that the principle issue was a question of law, not
fact. This was error, as the only legal issue before the court was
the appropriate test to apply in the matter. . ."

While the court

does cite a previous Utah Court of Appeals case to the effect that
an appellate court is ". . . i n as good a position to review the
proffer as was the trial court. . .", the court was also basing its
decision on findings of fact supporting its judgment made by the
lower court.

In the instant case, we have no findings of fact or

conclusions of law which support the judgment of the lower court,
and it would be a great injustice for this court to attempt to
substitute its judgment for that of the lower court, whether the
proof was presented to the lower court by proffers or otherwise,
under these circumstances.
Furthermore, Foothills cites the case of Bill Nay & Sons
Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984)
for the proposition that a trial court's decision should be
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affirmed when it can be done so on a proper ground, even though it
was not the ground on which the trial court relied in its ruling.
While Foothills states the proposition accurately as presented in
the Nay case, the Supreme Court also clearly stated:

,f

[W]hile

there was an evidentiary basis for such a finding and this Court
can make its own findings in an equity case, we normally refrain
from doing so."

677 P.2d at 1123.

In the Nay case, there was a clear alternative legal basis for
sustaining the trial court's decision as a matter of law, even
though the court had failed to make a finding of fact on the
specific type of fraud perpetrated in that case. Homeowners submit
that the instant case is not a proper case for that kind of
substitution as a matter of law by this reviewing Court.
particularly

true

where

absolutely

no

findings

of

This is
fact

or

conclusions of law supporting the quiet title order in favor of
Foothills were entered by the lower court. Rather than just trying
to fill in an alternative legal theory which would support the
lower court's judgment as did the Supreme Court in the Nay case,
the appellate court in this instance would be required to make a
whole series of findings of fact and conclusions of law to support
the lower court's quiet title order.
Homeowners presented the clear proposition in its opening
brief at pages 28 and 29 that Utah case law mandates in an action
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to quiet title, a plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the strength
of his own title rather than the weakness of the defendant's title.
Homeowners made the statement in its opening brief that counsel had
been unable to find a single case of any kind which would support
the remedy fashioned by the trial judge in the instant case; that
is, findings of fact and conclusions of law which support a quiet
title order in favor of Plaintiff, but involving a quiet title
order issued in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to pay
a sum of money to obtain its quiet title order.

Homeowners

challenged Foothills or Bagley to present case authority for the
remedy fashioned by the trial judge, but this challenge was not
answered in either the Consolidated Initial Brief of Foothills
Water Company, or Appellants Bagleys' Consolidated Initial Brief on
its

Cross

Appeal

Association.

and

Opposing

Brief

on

the

Appeal

of

the

Neither Appellee bothered to make any reference

whatsoever to Homeowners' conclusion that no case law exists which
supports the lower court's judgment in this matter.

Therefore,

Homeowners believe that the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed as a matter of law.
It should be noted in addition, that when the quiet title
order was finally issued in favor of Foothills Water Company based
upon the failure of Homeowners to pay the sum of $98,500.00
(R.1931-1936), neither Foothills nor Bagleys chose to move the
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court for an amendment to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law pursuant to the provisions of Rule 52(b), in an effort to
create findings and conclusions which would support the quiet title
order of the court.

It is inappropriate for Foothills to now

argue, as they do in their Initial Consolidated Brief, that despite
the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the
quiet title order in their favor, this appellate court should now
jump in and decide all of the facts and make all of the legal
conclusions necessary

to support the lower court's judgment.

(Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C. at pp. 25-34).
Foothills also makes the untrue and misleading argument that
it was the only one that submitted proffers of evidence with regard
to the disputed issues of fact in the case. Foothills then argues
that because Homeowners did not submit proffers, the court should
have simply ruled in Foothills1 favor automatically.

(Cons. In.

Br. of Foothills W.C. at pp. 25, 26). Despite this request of the
court, Foothills admits that "... [W]ith some effort the parties
did arrive at a stipulated statement of facts which were not in
dispute, together with a list of fact issues as to which the
parties could not agree. That document appears at pages 565-596 of
the record herein. . .".
The fallacy of Foothills' argument is that the court had the
clear ability to decide, based upon the stipulated statement of
28

facts, that a quiet title order should be issued in favor of
Homeowners.

In fact, the court used just this procedure when it

announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of
Homeowners in the following ways:
1.

In its oral comments on October 25, 1988 (not yet

transferred by reporter Brad Young, see p. 8 this brief and add.
4);
2.

In its Order on Ownership Issues signed by Judge

Brian on October 20, 1989, embodying the oral decision announced
October 25, 1988 (R.895-898);
3.

In its Minute Entry of December 28, 1989 (R.1166);

4. In its January 17, 1990 Order Re: Further Proceedings
(R.1205-1210);
5.
6.

In its Minute Entry of January 31, 1990 (R.1228);
In its Memorandum Decision on August

16, 1990

(R.1538-1543).
Although it is true that Rule 52 URCP allows findings of fact
and conclusions of law to be stated orally, recorded in open court
following the close of evidence, or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court even though not embodied
in formal findings and conclusions, all of the minute entries, oral
opinions and orders entered by the court found the facts and
conclusions of law in favor of Homeowners.
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Such findings and

conclusions were appropriate in light of the fact that both
Appellees in this case stipulated and agreed to facts which lead to
the court's judgment.

The alleged "undisputed evidence" referred

to by Foothills in their Consolidated Initial Brief is actually
evidence disputed by the very stipulation they entered into with
regard to the facts of the case (R.565-596).
It is illogical for Foothills to argue that the mere fact that
it submitted certain proffers, and other parties did not submit
proffers, means that the court should automatically have accepted
the proffers as true

(despite all other facts in the case,

including stipulated facts), and therefore the Court should have
automatically issued judgment in favor of the party submitting the
proffers. This position simply cannot be accepted by this Court as
a basis upon which to substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court with regard to findings of fact and conclusions of law in
this matter.
POINT

II

THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH DISPUTED FACTS,
AND FOOTHILLS1 ASSERTION THAT THE RECORD
SUPPORTS THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS.
Despite Foothill's argument that its proffers should be viewed
by this appellate court as "uncontroverted", Homeowners maintain
that the record contains numerous facts, many stipulated to by
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Foothills and Bagleys, which supported the court's initial judgment
that a quiet title order should be issued in favor of Homeowners.
Foothills claims in its Initial Consolidated Brief that the
instruments relied upon by Homeowners are ineffective because they
were obtained for no value and with full knowledge of the claim of
Foothills and its predecessors. To some extent, Bagleys make this
same argument.

This argument however, completely overlooks the

record evidence cited by Homeowners in their opening brief at pages
15-22; and 42-47.

The evidence is clear, and it may be presumed

that Judge Brian originally agreed, that Homeowners had indeed
obtained the water system and the water right for value. The value
provided was from the proceeds paid to Bagley and his partners for
the initial sale of the lots in the subdivision. Homeowners quoted
extensively from the deposition testimony of Appellee Gerald H.
Bagley in which Dr. Bagley had indicated that he had recovered the
cost of the water system through the price established for the sale
of the lots (H.O. Op. Br. at 17, 18).

Furthermore, in his

deposition, Charles Lewton, one of the original developers and a
principal in Hi-Country Estates, Inc., testified that the reason
the Homeowners Association was created by the developers originally
was so that they could take over the "amenities" that would service
all of the lot owners.

When asked what types of amenities he was

referring to, Mr. Lewton included the roads, the gate and the water
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system.

He further stated that it was the intention of the

developers all along either to turn the water system over to the
Homeowners

Association

Conservancy (District).

or

the

Salt

Lake

City

(sic

County)

(H.O. Op. Br. at 21, 22).

Even though proffers of another of the original developers,
Keith Spencer, seemed to contradict Mr. Lewton's testimony, the
court obviously resolved that issue of fact in favor of the
Homeowners (R.895-898).
It

should

be

noted

that

in

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989 (R.895-898), the lower
court adopted and incorporated by reference as its own findings of
fact the parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts dated
September 16, 1988, paragraphs 1 through 89 inclusive. From these
undisputed facts stipulated to by the parties, the court concluded
the following:
1.

Hi-Country Estates, Inc., held right, title and

interest in the disputed water system (R.569, 572, 573, 576, 581,
and 582).
2. The 1974 agreement between Hi-Country Estates Second
and Bagley & Company was only an agreement to convey right, title
and interest in the disputed water system, and did not constitute
a deed or legal document of conveyance (R.574, Ex. NN-R 1750-1759).
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3.

Homeowners had obtained legal right, title and

interest in the disputed water system from two 1975 quit claim
deeds issued by Hi-Country Estates, Inc. and Hi-Country Estates
Second (R.576); a 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake County to
Homeowners conveying all the water tank lots in the disputed
subdivision to Homeowners (R.577-580); a 1985 deed from Hi-Country
Estates, Inc. to Plaintiff conveying the water tank lots to
Homeowners (R.581, 582); two 1985 recorded quit claim deeds from
Zions Bank and Trust conveying the water tank lots to Homeowners
(R.581); an assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Homeowners
of the disputed water right (R.582); an acknowledgement by the
State Engineer's Division of Water Rights that the Homeowners are
the owner of the disputed water right in this case (the Glazier
well water right) (R.581, 585).
Due to these facts, the allegation by both Appellees in their
briefs that the court had no evidentiary basis upon which to decide
the ownership issue is inaccurate and misleading.

The court

resolved these critical issues of fact in favor of Homeowners; yet
Foothills' argument is simply that the failure of Homeowners to
provide proffers as Foothills did means that the case should have
necessarily been resolved in favor of Foothills.

This conclusion

is simply not logical and not supported by the evidence considered

33

by the lower court in creating its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in this case.
Homeowners believe it is significant that the burden Foothills
and Bagleys must meet in order to convince this Court that the
record in this case supports the district court's judgment quieting
title in favor of Foothills, is to show that the Findings of Fact
were clearly erroneous; especially since the Findings did not
support the judgment in this case. Foothills simply argues that it
raised factual questions which were resolved against it, but the
lower court was wrong in doing so.
burden of establishing

They clearly have not met the

that the lower court's Findings were

"clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,
1092 (Utah 1991).
POINT

III

APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT ARGUMENTS OR
AUTHORITY JUSTIFYING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION
THAT HOMEOWNERS SHOULD HAVE A QUIET TITLE ORDER,
BUT ONLY IF THEY PAY FOOTHILLS $98,500.00.
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that in an action to
quiet title, where it proved that it was entitled to possession and
that legal title vested in it, the law would presume that it was in
constructive possession and, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it was entitled

to actual possession.

McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 106 P. 669 (Utah 1910).

Gibson v.
Furthermore,

Homeowners argued that the Utah Supreme Court has held consistently
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that in an action to quiet title, a plaintiff must succeed by
virtue of the strength of his own title (H.O. Op- Br. at 28); and
that it seemed arbitrary, capricious, unjust and unfair for the
trial court to have ruled that Homeowners are the legal owner of
the water system and water right based upon the strength of its
title, but then rule that despite its inferior claim to title, a
quiet title order would be issued in the name of Foothills if
Homeowners

didn't pay Foothills $98,500.00-

Foothills' only

response to this argument was that the Homeowners would be unjustly
enriched if they were given a quiet title order without first
paying money. Although they make this argument on pages 22 and 23
of their Consolidated Initial Brief, they failed to respond to
Homeowners' challenge to cite a case or statute allowing such a
contingent quiet title order to be issued.

Counterclaims or

setoffs could be dealt with by the issuance of a lien.
quiet

title

in

one

not

entitled

to

such

an

order

Ordering
is

an

inappropriate remedy at law for failure to pay sums owing to
another.

Homeowners suggest that Appellees have failed to present

appropriate arguments or authority justifying this decision by the
lower court, and request that the judgment be reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court with instructions to enter a quiet
title order in favor of Homeowners.
POINT
35

IV

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDERS REGARDING THE
VALUATION OF THE WATER SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT,
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that the lower court
should have granted summary judgment on the valuation issue based
upon

a

determination

of

the

subject

by

the

Public

Service

Commission in the case entitled In the Matter of the Application of
Foothills Water Company, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity to Operate as a Public Utility, Case No. 85-2010-01
before the Public Service Commission of Utah dated March 17, 1986
(R.1044-1094). Appellant quotes extensively from that decision on
pages 30-40 of its opening brief.
Foothills1 response to this argument was simply that the
Public Service Commission did not attempt to determine the value of
the water system or any improvements to it.

Foothills suggests

that the Homeowners' position erroneously assumes that cost and
value are identical.

Furthermore, Foothills argues that U.C.A.

§ 54-4-21 statutorily empowers the Public Service Commission to
value utility company assets exclusively
setting rates".

"for the purpose of

Foothills suggests that Homeowners have cited no

authority in their opening brief for the proposition that the
Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the value of utility company assets, and that the district court
should therefore have requested such a determination from the
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Commission, or entered summary judgment based upon the Commission's
March 17, 1986 Order (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., pp. 39-42).
Appellants

Bagleys

in their

Consolidated

Initial

Brief

make

essentially the same argument at page 15.
Appellees would have the Court ignore the clear language of
U.C.A. § 54-4-21 (Valuation of public utilities) which states as
follows:
The commission shall have power to ascertain
the value of the property of every public
utility in this state and every fact which in
its judgment may or does have any bearing on
such value. The commission shall have power
to make revaluations from time to time and to
ascertain the value of new construction,
extensions, and additions to the property of
every public utility ; provided, that the
valuation of the property of all public
utilities doing business within this state
located in Utah as recorded in accordance with
Section 54-4-22 of this chapter shall be
considered the actual value of the properties
of said public utilities in Utah unless
otherwise changed after hearings by order of
the commission.
In case the commission
changes the valuation of the properties of any
public utility said new valuations found by
the commission shall be the valuations of said
public utility for all purposes provided in
this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
As can be seen, this statute does not give the Public Service
Commission exclusive authority to ascertain the value of property
for rate making purposes only, but purports to provide such
authority to the Public Service Commission for valuing all assets
of a public utility for all purposes.
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As a matter of fact, the

Utah Supreme Court has construed this statute precisely the way
Homeowners have asked this Court to construe it.
In the case of Utah Power & Light Company v. Public Service
Commission, 122 Utah 284, 249 P.2d 951 (1952), Chief Justice Wolfe,
in a unanimous opinion (with a concurring opinion by Justice Hoyt)
construing the forerunner of U.C.A. § 54-4-21 which was U.C.A.
§ 76-4-21), considered an argument by Utah Power and Light Company
that the only purpose of the statute was to find the value of
public utilities and use that value as a base for determining just
and reasonable rates. The Court reviewed the company's contention
that the language of this statute (and other associated statutes)
showed a legislative intent to have rates based upon value; and
therefore if "cost" was to be used in place of "value", there would
be

no

necessity

for

or

meaning

revaluations from time to time.

to

the

language

requiring

The Supreme Court, in responding

to this argument, held:
We believe that these two statutes, even when
lifted from the Act and considered by
themselves,
show
that
the
legislature
contemplated that there would be situations
under which various departments of the state
would find it necessary to know or to prove
the value of a public utility.
This is
evidenced by the provision that the findings
of value, when properly made, would be
admissible in evidence in the various named
proceedings in which the departments of the
state or various bodies politic might be
interested.
This language indicates that
these sections (76-4-21 and 76-6-19) were not
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designed to require the commission to find
value for rate making purposes.
Since the
valuation findings were by statute made
admissible in evidence in various types of
proceedings and were to be conclusive in
absence of a showing of changed conditions,
etc., it is only logical that the statute
would provide a procedure for reevaluations
from time to time to keep the valuation
abreast of changing conditions.
There is nothing in section 76-4-21 which
requires that it be construed as a mandate to
the commission to base rates on value rate
base . . . these sections contain no mandate
that rates be based on a fair value rate
base . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
152 P.2d at 554, 555.
The Supreme Court went on to discuss a case cited by the
Company from Pennsylvania used as a precedent for the proposition
that Utah's valuation section (76-4-21) must be construed as a
mandate for the commission to bottom rates upon a value rate base.
The Supreme Court clearly distinguished the Pennsylvania case on
the

basis

that

the

equivalent

of

the valuation

statute

in

Pennsylvania was expressly limited to valuation for purposes of
"rates and rate making."

The Supreme Court held that Utah's

valuation statute was not limited to valuation for the purposes of
rate making as was Pennsylvania's.

152 P.2d at 555, 556.

Therefore, it continues to be the position of Homeowners that
U.C.A. § 54-7-19 (as amended 1987) makes clear that the findings of
the Public Service Commission are conclusive evidence of the value
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of public utilities in any hearing before "any court."

The

arguments made by Appellees in their briefs therefore are erroneous
and should be rejected by this Court.

Homeowners continue to

believe that the very least the trial court should have done was to
submit

this matter

to the

Public

Service

Commission

for a

determination of the value of assets of Foothills Water Company,
but only if it were not willing to accept the value established by
the Public Service Commission in its Order of March 17, 1986 for
the years between 1974 and 1985, which was the focus of Judge
Brian's Order on Ownership Issues.

Paragraph 3 of that order

stated, "An order quieting title to the water system, in the name
of plaintiff (Homeowners) will issue only upon payment in full by
plaintiff to defendant of the court's reimbursement order for
improvements by the defendant to the plaintiff's water system for
the years 1974 to 1985" (R.897).
POINT

V

APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY RESPOND TO
HOMEOWNERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S ORIGINAL
DECISION TO QUIET TITLE IN HOMEOWNERS, BUT SUBJECT
TO THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER THROUGH THE SYSTEM BY
FOOTHILLS, WAS ERRONEOUS.
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that the lower court's
initial decision to enter a quiet title order in its favor, but
subject to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement between Gerald H. Bagley
and Jesse Dansie to transport free water through the system to the
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Dansie family was unfair, unjust and erroneous.
pp. 42-47).

(H.O. Op. Br. at

Homeowners pointed out that the Public Service

Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986 had found
this

Agreement

to

be

"grossly

unreasonable"

and

"showering

virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his
immediate family."
been

a party

unreasonable

Homeowners also pointed out that it had not

to

this Agreement

terms

upon

them

and

would

to
be

impose

its

grossly

unfair

and

unjust.

Furthermore, Homeowners argued that the Agreement expired by its
own terms on April 10, 1987 and no document of renewal in any form
was presented to the trial court. Finally, Homeowners argued that
Finding of Fact No. 5, upon which the court's order was based, was
internally inconsistent and ambiguous (R.1622).
Foothills responded to these arguments with less than a half
a page in its brief (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., at pg. 43).
Despite the fact that the Public Service Commission in its March
17, 1986 Report and Order had ruled that the Agreement was grossly
unreasonable and ordered Foothills Water Company to obtain its
approval before entering into any future lease or sales agreement
for the provision of water to Foothills' service area (R.1079),
Foothills

argues

that

"[T]he

encumbrance

was,

if

anything,

recognized and validated by the Public Service Commission."
statement is simply false!

This

Foothills' refusal to even respond to
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the argument that the Agreement expired on its face on April 10,
1987, shows that it simply has no basis upon which it can argue
that the judge's order be upheld with regard to that Agreement.
Furthermore, Homeowners argued in its opening brief that the
court's initial decision to provide a quiet title order to the
water system to Homeowners but subject to allowing Foothills to
continue to transport water through the system to customers outside
of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, was clearly erroneous.
Homeowners argued that no evidence of any kind was presented to the
lower court to justify this portion of the order.

In addition,

Homeowners argued that no appropriate finding of fact or conclusion
of law was entered by the court to support this provision, and
therefore that portion of the order should be vacated upon remand.
(H.O. Op. Br. at 47-49).
Foothills simply argues in its Consolidated Initial Brief that
this issue is moot.

However, Homeowners are requesting that this

Court reverse the lower court's judgment quieting title to the
water system and water right in Foothills and remand the case with
instructions to enter a quiet title order in favor of Homeowners.
Homeowners also ask that this Court invalidate this encumbrance
requiring Homeowners to allow Foothills to transport water through
its system to outside customers. Only in this way can the court's
determination be truly fair and just.
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Even though an appellate

court may reverse a judgment due to any number of reasons, it does
have the power to review and decide matters which may become
material when a case is remanded for further proceedings. LeGrand
Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, supra; Anderson v. Utah County Board of
County Commissioners, supra.
It is to be noted that Appellees Bagleys do not even address
the issues contained in this Point.
POINT

VI

FOOTHILLST CLAIMS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE WERE
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In its Consolidated Initial Brief, Foothills argues that there
was "undisputed evidence" that the actions of Homeowners, through
its president Norman Sims and its agent William Turner, slandered
the title of Foothills Water Company to the water system and the
water right. The trial court dismissed these allegations outright.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20,
1989, and again in its Order on Ownership Issues dated October 20,
1989, the court states:

"The counterclaim by Foothills Water

Company is hereby dismissed for lack of proof"

(R.897, 904).

The court obviously believed Foothills had failed to present
sufficient evidence to make out the elements of an action for
slander of title.

In Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d

1131 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court stated the elements of slander
of title as follows:
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" . . . willful recordation or publication of
untrue material that is disparaging to
another's title. . . plaintiff must prove that
he was specifically injured by the action. . .
malice is also an element of the cause of
action. . . such malice. . . requires a
showing that the wrong was done with the
intent to injure, vex or annoy. . .".
751 P.2d at 1134.
In the instant action, the trial judge ruled that the actions
taken by the Homeowners Association were appropriate, and found as
a matter of fact and concluded as a matter of law, that Homeowners
were entitled to a quiet title order based upon their chain of
title to the water system

and the water right

in question.

Therefore, since truth is an absolute defense to a slander of title
action (publication of untrue material is required), the court
properly dismissed the slander of title claims against Homeowners.
Furthermore, even if it could be shown that the publication in
question was false, it must be shown that the publication was done
with malice.

There

simply

was no evidence

whatsoever

that

Homeowners and their agents took the actions complained of by
Foothills with the intent to injure, vex, or annoy Foothills.
Indeed, all of the evidence and the stipulated facts in the lower
court demonstrate that Homeowners and their agents undertook all
actions involved with this case in good faith with an intent to
prove in court that they were the rightful owners of the water
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system and the water right in question, which they actually
succeeded in doing.
Foothills' burden is to show that the court's findings and
conclusions with regard to their slander of title claims were
clearly erroneous.

They simply cannot meet this burden on appeal

with what they have presented to this Court.
POINT

VII

APPELLEE BAGLEYS' CLAIMS WERE APPROPRIATELY
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Bagleys' Consolidated Initial Brief essentially makes two
claims which relate directly to Homeowners.

The first is that

Bagley is entitled to recover from Homeowners amounts expended by
Bagley for capital improvements to the water system and operating
losses under the principles of quantum meruit.

Secondly, Bagley

argues that it is entitled to recover amounts expended for capital
improvements and operating losses since it was a resulting or
constructive trustee of the water system for the benefit of
Homeowners and its members.

Although Bagley makes a third point

regarding the Association's basis for its claim that it should not
be required to pay some amount before a quiet title order is
entered, such argument has been dealt with in previous points in
this Reply Brief.

Finally, Bagleys argue that the lower court

erred in ordering reimbursement only to Foothills Water Company and
none to Bagley.

Homeowners see this as an issue for cross-appeal
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between Bagley and Foothills; but to the extent that said argument
relates to Homeowners, Homeowners have either dealt with it in
previous points of this Reply Brief, or will deal with it in this
section.
While it is true that the lower court concluded as a matter of
law that "Defendants Foothills Water Company, and/or Bagley and
Company, by virtue of several legal and equitable principles are
entitled to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made by them
to Plaintiff's water system from 1974 to 1985" (R.903), Homeowners
maintain that it is unclear as to what
principles the court was referring to.
those

principles,

but

Homeowners

legal and equitable

The court never specified

is willing

accept

Bagleyfs

argument that the main principle in question is that of quantum
meruit or unjust enrichment.
It is the position of Homeowners that the court was consistent
with the conclusion of law referred to above when it further
concluded as a matter of law that:
Defendants Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley and
Company are not entitled to any compensation
for alleged operating losses and capital
improvements relating to the subject water
system or water rights due to the fact that
said defendants transferred all claims,
rights, title and interest in said water
system and water right to defendant J. Rodney
Dansie by agreement of October 31, 1985; and
all such claims, rights, title and interest in
said water system and water right merged with
those of defendant J. Rodney Dansie and
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defendant Foothills Water Company as of that
date.
(R. 1623).
Homeowners find it extremely significant that although Bagleys
make four major points in their brief, they do not even address the
conclusion of law of the trial judge related above.

They do not

argue that their interests were not merged as the trial court
ruled, nor do they assign as error that the trial court found their
interests merged with that of Foothills upon the transfer of the
water system and the water right to Foothills Water Company!
Bagleys1 only argument seems to be that the court should have
awarded them some compensation for their capital improvements and
operating losses, but it is difficult for Homeowners to respond
when Bagleys choose not to even address the basis for the court's
ruling in their opening brief.

Perhaps Bagleys are lying in wait

ready to make their arguments against the court's merger conclusion
of law once Homeowners has had its one and only opportunity to
reply

to

their

opening

brief.

If

this

is

so,

Homeowners

respectfully request that Bagleys not be rewarded for such strategy
and that their arguments on appeal be summarily dismissed.
As previously noted, Homeowners, Foothills and Bagleys entered
into a "Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed
Contentions" signed by all attorneys for the parties on September
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16, 1988.

In Finding of Fact Nos. 81 and 82, the parties

stipulated and agreed to the following:
81. . . . Eventually, in an effort to satisfy
part of the obligations to Mr. Dansie for his
services, Dr. Bagley transferred to Mr. Dansie
both his stock in Foothills Water Company (the
company which Dr. Bagley had formed to own and
operate the water system), and the assets of
that company and other property.
82. Exhibits NN and PP are true and accurate
copies of the documents effecting that
transfer.
(R.583).
Exhibit NN is an agreement made and entered into on October
31, 1985 by and between J. Rodney Dansie, Gerald H. Bagley, Bagley
and

Company,

a

partnership,

and

Jordan

Acres,

a

limited

partnership, referred to in the agreement collectively as "Bagley",
and the Foothills Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation.
document is attached as Addendum 2 to this Reply Brief.

That

In that

agreement, Bagley agrees to sell, transfer, assign and convey to
Dansie, among other things,

,f

[A]ny and all stock in and to the

Foothills Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, free and clear
of any and all liens and encumbrances"; and ,f[T]he assets listed on
Exhibit A attached hereto, which Bagley covenants and warrants that
Foothills presently owns, free and clear of all encumbrances,
excepting the claims of Dansie"

(R.1793).
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Exhibit A attached to that agreement lists the water tank
parcel in Lot 67, tank no. 2, associated pipe lines, all easements,
rights-of-way, and fixtures located within the service area of the
water company, all easements, rights-of-way, pipe lines, fixtures
or other equipment or personal property located in the Hi-Country
Estates Subdivisions, South Oquirrh Subdivision and Beagley Acres
which is owned by Foothills and relates in any way to its water
utility business, and water rights application number 33130 (591608) (the Glazier well water right or disputed water right in this
lawsuit) (R.1799).
As if to make certain that it was clear to the world that
Bagley was assigning all of his right, title and interest in the
disputed water right, and water system serving Hi-Country Estates
Subdivision Phase I, Dr. Bagley "personally and as the Authorized
Representative of Jordan Acres" produced and signed a document
entitled

"Assignment" which was Exhibit PP to the Stipulated

Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions (Addendum
3).

This additional Assignment makes clear that Dr. Bagley as an

individual as well as Jordan Acres as a limited partnership through
its agent, Dr. Bagley, assigned to Foothills Water Company "all
right, title and interest in any and all water rights, equipment,
easements, rights-of-way or property they have or may have in or to
or associated with the water system located generally in the Hi49

Country Estates Subdivision, Phase I, which said water system is
presently owned, operated and managed by the Foothills Water
Company."

This Assignment was dated January 17, 1986 (R.1801).

Since the parties had stipulated that these exhibits were true
and correct copies of the documents in question, and since the
parties had stipulated that these documents were to be included as
part of the Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed
Contentions, the court adopted these documents as part of its
Findings of Fact entered October 20, 1989 (R.901, para. 1).
Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned finding of
fact, the court made an additional finding of fact as part of its
Order of October 31, 1990 in which it found:
8. Defendants Bagley and Company and Gerald
H. Bagley transferred all their respective
claims, rights, title and interest in
Foothills Water Company and the subject water
system and water right to Defendant J. Rodney
Dansie by agreement between the parties dated
October 31, 1985.
(R.1623).
As a result of these findings of fact, the court adopted this
previously cited conclusion of law in its October 31, 1990 Order:
1. Defendants Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley and
Company are not entitled to any compensation
for alleged operating losses and capital
improvements relating to the subject water
system or water right due to the fact that
said Defendants transferred all claims,
rights, title and interest in said water
system and water right to Defendant J. Rodney
Dansie by agreement of October 31, 1985; and
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all such claims, rights, title and
said water system and water right
those of Defendant J. Rodney
Defendant Foothills Water Company
date.

interest in
merged with
Dansie and
as of that
(R.1623).

There simply can be no question that Appellees Bagleys have
failed to establish that the court's findings of fact referred to
above are clearly erroneous.

This is true in light of the fact

that they stipulated and agreed to the underlying documents and
facts which led to the court's Findings of Facts.

Furthermore,

since Appellees Bagleys do not challenge the Conclusion of Law No.
1 in their Consolidated Initial Brief, it can only be presumed that
they are unable to demonstrate to the Court that this conclusion of
law is not legally correct.
In fact, the court's conclusion of law is legally correct. It
should not require citation to authority for one to advocate the
proposition

that

a contract

and assignment

stating

that the

assignors assign all right, title and interest in certain property
is valid and legal under Utah law. No party in this case has ever
raised an issue with regard to any alleged invalidity of the
agreement or assignment stipulated to by all the parties as being
valid and legal; and therefore the court may assume that the
parties had the capacity to contract and that the contracts and
assignments in question are legal and valid.
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Nevertheless, if some authority is needed, counsel would cite
to the Court the case of Wiscorn v. Lockhart Company, 608 P.2d 236
(Utah

1980),

in which

the

Supreme

Court

declared

that

the

fundamental law of assignment is that the assignee takes nothing
more by his assignment than his assignor had.

608 P.2d at 238.

While it is Foothills' contention and the court's Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of

Law

that

Appellees

Bagleys

had

divested

themselves of all interest in the water system and water right in
question sometime prior to the agreements and assignments here (see
Judge Brian's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law referred to
earlier, R.899-904), as between Foothills and Bagley it may be
presumed that Bagleys transferred all their right, title and
interest (whatever it may be) to Foothills. Foothills thus becomes
their successor-in-interest and any claims or rights possessed by
Bagleys were assigned to Foothills.

Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah.2d

84, 305 P.2d 882 (1957).
Thus it may be presumed that the court determined as a matter
of law that the claims of Bagleys to reimbursement for capital
improvements and net operating losses were asserted in the trial of
this matter by Bagleys' successor-in-interest

Foothills Water

Company (R.1623), and therefore the court ordered Homeowners to pay
the sum of $98,500.00 to Foothills in satisfaction of all such
claims.
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Homeowners will not reply to the arguments made by Appellees
Bagley further other than to say that their arguments that they
deserve reimbursement overlook the testimony of Dr. Gerald Bagley
in his deposition referred to previously in which he admitted that
the value of the water system was recovered from the sale of the
lots (R.1650 pp. 29-30).

Furthermore/ even though Bagley operated

illegally as an uncertificated public utility prior to 1986, he was
assessing and collecting fees from each of the lot owners of HiCountry Estates Subdivision, Phase I, ostensibly to cover his
operating expenses (R.580).
Homeowners respectfully request that the claims of Bagleys be
dismissed and that whatever decisions the Court makes with regard
to the other issues in this lawsuit, the Court clearly affirms the
lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to
Appellees Bagleys1 assignment, transfer and merger of their claims
with those of J. Rodney Dansie and Appellee Foothills Water Company
as of the date of the agreements aforementioned.

CONCLUSION
Appellant

Hi-Country

Estates

Homeowners

Association

respectfully requests that the quiet title order issued by the
lower court be set aside and remanded to the lower court with
instructions for the court to enter a quiet title order in favor of
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Homeowners.

In the alternative, Homeowners request that the

court's judgment and order quieting title in Foothills be reversed
and the case be remanded for a new trial, or such other proceedings
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as this Honorable Court feels is appropriate in the premises.
DATED this

16

day of

1992.

2LLER,
:or Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this
JO" day of August, 1992, to:
Val R. Antczak
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for Foothills
and J. Rodney Dansie
PO. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorney for Bagley and
Company and Gerald H.
Bagley
68 South Main #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM 1

Independent Forensic Laboratories
S 1 8 S ESPAORILLE DRIVE,

GBOmGE J . T H R O C K M O R T O N
DIRECTOR

SALT L A K E CITY. U T A H 8 4 1 1 6

CBOI) 3 6 8 - 6 8 5 6

August 30, 1988

iecn)5«e-7326

Robert A. Bentley
Attorney at Law
50 West Broadway, 10th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Mr. Bentley,

re: Hi-Country Estates

This report pertains to my examination of the following documents as per
your request:
Writing in Question:
A copy of a nine page "Agreement" dated 22 Way 74. This appears to be a
reduced-size copy that had originally been on legal size paper but was
reduced to accomodate a 8x11 inch photo-copy process. The handwritten
notation "#31" appears on the bottom right hand portion of page 1.
An examination was conducted on this typed agreement to determine if there
were indications of alterations, deletions, interlineations, obliterations,
or anything else suspicious in nature.
There were certain limitations imposed by the examination of this document
because it was a "reduced-size copy" of an original. Several important and
significant tests which specificially relate to authenticity can not be
conducted on copies. Although many tests and observations were made on
this "copy" it is still preferred that the original be obtained and
submitted for examination if possible.
However, in spite of these limitations I made the following observations in
connection with my examination of this document:
I.
Several typewriters were used to type this document. The bulk of
the document was typed with one typewriter. A second typewriter was used
to type the bottom paragraph of page #1. A third typewriter was used to
type page #9. It is possible, but could not be verified, that a 4th and/or
5th typewriter was used to make the following insertions:
a. Page 1: top paragraph, the name "GERALD H. BAGLEY"
b. Page 6: paragraph 14 beginning "or Buyer to enforce..." and
ending with "...reasonable attorneys fees."
c. Page 6: paragraph 16, the final portion which states "...after
five (5) days written notice, may either:"
II.
Certain individual and distinct characteristics called "trash
marks" were observed on the document. These trash marks indicate that page
6 and 9 were photo-copied on a different machine than was used to copy the
other 7 pages.

Robert A. Bentley
8-30-88.
page 2. . .

III.
The author of the handwriting on page 2 was different than the
author of the handwriting on page 9.
IV.
The final paragraph of page 9, which states "All right, title and
interest in and to the water system and equipment serving Hi-Country
Estates." was typed at a different time than the rest of the page.
On Friday August 26, 1988 I met with Attorney Marsh and receiv/ed from him a
full size copy of a similar agreement as previously described. I briefly
examined the thermofax copy in his possession and was allowed to take a
copy of his copy with me for further examination. This copy had a
handwritten #5 in the upper left hand corner. Henseforth I will refer to
Marsh's copy as copy #5 and Bentley!s copy as copy #31.
My examination and comparison of copy #5 and #31 revealed the following
information:
1.
Copies #5 and #31 were not copied from the same source. It appears
like there was a master document somewhere, and copies were made from this
master. Copies made from this master are called "first-generation" copies.
At least two different "first-generation" copies were made and the bottom
paragraph on page 1 was typed in separately on each of two copies. #5 and
#31 were typed at different times, but it appears they were typed on a
similar typewriter.
2.
Pages 6 and 9 were probably similarily copied from a similar firstgeneration source, but the remaining seven pages of these two sets were
copied from separate sources, or on different machines.
3.
The handwritten serial number on page 2 is different on each of
these two copies.
SUMMARY:
There are many inconsistencies found within and between
documents. There are first, second, and possibly third
that were examined. Neither set of pages is consistent
each other. Different typewriters, and additions found
the document are suspicious in and of itself.

these two
generation copies
within itself or
within the text of

It is possible to make all types of alterations and changes to a document
that can effectively be covered up through using techniques involving the
photo-copy process. The photo-copy process also tends to hide certain
distinct and unique characteristic traits that can be used to authenticate
a document.

Robert A, Bentley
8-30-88
page 3•••

Because of these and other limitations I was unable to make as complete and
thorough an examination as desired but, I hope the observations made will
be of value to you. If I may be of further assistance, please give me a
call. I am returning the above described writing to you with this report.
Respectfully,

hrockmorton
ocument Examiner
GJT:ct
enclosure

ADDENDUM 2

AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this ^5/4z2fr1day of
October, 1985, by and between J. RODNEY DANSIE, an individual,
hereinafter referred to as "Dansie", GERALD H. BAGLEY, BAGLEY &
COMPANY, a partnership, and JORDAN ACRES, a limited partnership, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Bagley"# and THE
•FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter
referred to as "Foothills".
RECITALS:
A.
On or before December 1, 1982, Dansie contracted
with Bagley and/or Foothills to provide work and/or materials
for the repair and maintenance of the Foothills water system,
and pursuant to said contract, Dansie provided services and
materials during the period beginning December 1, 1982, and
continuing through October 8, 1984, with respect to that
certain Foothills water utility system located on that certain
real property located in the Hi-Country Estates Subdivision in
Salt Lake County, Utah.
B.
Dansie has been paid for a portion of the
materials and labor provided, but claims an additional amount
totaling $80,447.43.
C.
On
October
10,
1984,
October
12,
1984,
December 5, 1984, and January 21, 1985, Dansie filed Notices of
Liens with the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, with respect
to certain property owned by Bagley and Foothills, evidencing
the amount owed and outstanding pursuant to the materials and
services provided.
D.
On October 7, 1985, Dansie filed a complaint
against Bagley, Foothills and others in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County for the amounts owed and
outstanding, and for other relief (the "Action").
E.
Dansie performed additional work and labor after
October 8, 1984, through and including October 5, 1985, and has
filed an additional Notice of Lien to secure the amounts owed
for said additional work and labor, which said additional
amount is $49,043.00.
F.
The parties hereto now desire to reach a certain
understanding with respect to the Action, the additional Notice
of Lien and amounts owed by Bagley and Foothills to Dansie, in
accordance with the terms set forth hereinafter.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions hereinafter recited, and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which
are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agfee as follows:
!• Bagley. Bagley agrees to sell, transfer, assign
and convey to Dansie the following property owned by Bagley:
(a) Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter
of the Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 4 South, Range
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, located in Salt Lake
County, Utah, which property shall be free and clear of any and
all liens and encumbrances affecting said property, excepting
liens and encumbrances filed by Dansie with respect to said
property, if any, to be conveyed by Warranty Deed; and
(b) Lot 43 of that certain Hi-Country Estates
Subdivision, Phase No* 1, located in Salt Lake County, Utah, to
be conveyed by Warranty Deed;
(c) Any and all stock in and to The Foothills
Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, free and clear of any
and all liens and encumbrances.
(d) The assets listed on Exhibit "A* attached
hereto, which Bagley covenants and warrants that Foothills
presently owns, free and clear of all encumbrances, excepting
the claims of Dansie.
2. Foothills.
the following:

Foothills agrees to deliver to Dansie

(a) Evidence
of
all
assets
of
Foothills,
together with any and all records, books, corporate documents
or other papers relevant in any way to the company, its operations, customers, creditors, receivables, authorization to do
business, corporate status and any other matters in any way
associated with the business of the company; and
(b) Evidence of any and all interests, rights or
other properties owned by the company, including rights
pursuant to contracts, permits, statutory or regulatory law,
water rights and other properties, assets or interests whatsoever owned by the company, or to which the company has rights
or interests of any sort whatsoever.
3. Dansie.
Tn consideration of the property and
assets assigned, transferred and/or conveyed to Dansie pursuant
to paragraph 1 and the evidence and information provided
pursuant to paragraph 2 hereof, Dansie hereby covenants that
following closing (as defined hereafter), Dansie will hold

G1733
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Bagley, Foothills and the principals of Foothills harmless from
liability for any claim, demand, action or cause of action for
damages, costs, expenses or compensation due Dansie arising out
of or associated with the claims described in the Action filed
by Dansie on October 7, 1985, in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and with respect to
the additional Notice of Lien filed by Dansie. Dansie further
.covenants to perform all services and to take all actions to
legally and properly operate the water system of Foothills and
to hold Bagley, Foothills and the principals of Foothills
harmless from all claims and obligations with respect thereto
arising after the date of closing.
4. Reservation of Rights. Dansie expressly reserves
any and all other rights of action, claims or demands Dansie
has or may have against any and all other persons arising out
of or in any way associated with the claims asserted and sought
by Dansie in the Action, including the right to continue to
foreclose said liens against any and all other parties asserting right in and to the property on which Dansie has filed said
liens.
5. Closing.
Dansie's covenants pursuant to this
Agreement shall become effective on the date of closing, at
which time Bagley and Foothills shall sell, assign, transfer,
convey and/or deliver to Dansie the property and items
described in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof. Closing shall occur
not later than November 15, 1985, at a place agreeable to the
parties hereto.
(a) At closing, Bagley and Foothills shall
deliver and present such documents, instruments, deeds, papers
and other items as may be necessary to convey, transfer and/or
assign to Dansie the property and items described in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof. In addition, Bagley shall provide title
insurance to the property to be conveyed pursuant to paragraph
1(a) hereof, and paragraph 2 of Exhibit "A*, in the amount of
$75,000 insuring title to said properties free and clear of any
and all liens and encumbrances, except the Notices of Liens
filed by Dansie.
(b) Dansie
instruments, pleadings,
necessary to formalize
Foothills harmless of and
in the Action.

shall deliver such other documents,
releases and/or papers as shall be
his agreement to hold Bagley and
from any and all claims he has sought

6. Additional Documentation,
The parties hereto
agree to execute any and all documents, instruments and/or
papers as may be necessary to satisfy the purposes of this
Agreement.
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7. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall inure
the benefit of the parties hereto and any heirs and le
representatives or successors in interest of the parties herei
8. Controlling
Law.
This
Agreement
shall
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caus
their names or the names of their duly authorized officers
be signed hereunder the day A-nd yea* £irst afcove written,

BAGLEY & COMPANY, a partnership,

JORDAN ACRES, a limited
partnership,

Gerald H. Bagley, Ger^ral^^artnei
THE FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

-4-
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

On the .3-/ day of October, 1985, personally appeared
before me J, RODNEY DANSIE, the signer of the above instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

VJ^J^^2£J^
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

(Pe>Z> /*. J<?f7
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

On the
day of October, 1985, personally
appeared before me GERALD H. BAGLEY, the signer of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing ^.x^JCZ/TJ^ie,^

LU&

My Commission Expires:

GI736
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
)
On the %3J&&
day oL October, '1985, personally
appeared before me J k ^ £ t ^ ^
partner of BAGLEY &
COMPANY, a partnership, tl^signeif^f^he above instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he execoted the same on behalf of
and by authority of said partnership.

<-zE&s

,

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ^

~J?

-^O"& /2

^ ^ P ^ A P ^

-¥

L^jf

My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On the
day of October, 1985, personally
appeared before me GERALD H. BAGLEY, General Partner of JORDAN
ACRES, a limited partnership, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on
behalf of and by authority of said partnership.

NOTARY PUBLIC /?
^p^
Residing a t ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ % ^ f g ^
My Commission Expires:
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

SS.

On the ^£z£r
day 06 October, '1985, personally
appeared before me S^^^*-^^^-^f^^i
JihQ being by me duly
sworn, did say that he is the /)'&*J',s&>~-^
of THE FOOTHILLS
JJATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of
its bylaws or of a^tfesoliition of its board of directors and
said _^ZJZyi^xJ2££^/Lu^^J^
duly acknowledged to me that said
corpo- raction executed/^he/same.

Cfrs
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
My Commission Expires:

7548C
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EXHIBIT "A"
Accounts Receivable of $
Octoberf 1985.

as of ,the

day of

Water Tank parcel (Lot 67)
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 67, Hi-Country
Estates Subdivision, said point is also North 89°42f24*
West along the section line 1028.38 feet and South
50*Q0f00" East 784.22 feet from the Northeast corner of
Section 5, Township 4 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence Southwesterly 67.73 feet
along the arc of a curve to the right through a central
angle of 4°47l28", the radius point of which is North
80°00,00" West 810.00 feet; thence North 50°00f00' West
231.38 feet; thence North 40°Q0,00* East 60.00 feet; thence
South 50p00,00' East
200.00 feet
to the point of
beginning. Contains 12,973.56 square feet or 0.2978 acres.
Tank No. 2, associated pipelines, all easements, rights of
way, and fixtures located on the NW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of
the SW 1/4 of S 5, T4S R2W SLB&M.
All easements, rights of way, pipelines, fixtures or other
equipment or personal property located in the Hi-Country
Estates Subdivisions, South Oquirrh Subdivision and Beagley
Acres which is owned by Foothills and relates in any way to
its water utility business.
Water Rights Application No. 33130 (59-1608)

8C
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ADDENDUM 3

ASSIGNMENT

„s

„

-ndividual,

and Jordan

Dr. Gerald
^hrouah

• u*.

fit-ie and 1 nteresi

authorized agent, U L .

-* *
y

-enl, easement,
have
,,„
generally

-xghts

t h e y

h a v e

o r

m a y

*.,
iated with

the water system
• • -~„ Phase
# which
*„„ Frtat-ps Subdivision, Pnase
,
the Hi-Country " L a L t - J
tne «^< nresently owned, operate
naged by
c
system is
presenuxj

the Foothills Water Company.
„~ ^ „
17 ^ B a v of January i 1,:>86.
DATED this / / — a a J

r

lERALD
and as the Author 1 zed
tive of Jordan Acres
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Dr.

ss.

Gerald

.

Bagley

personally

this / ^ d a y

oi

an agent
and i

Jordan Acres authorized
eu cue same i n d i v i d u a l l y

of

sonally
resenta-

appeared

before

JiiMiiiai y „ 1986 and acknowledged t o me t h a t

me

he

is

e x e c u t e t h i s document
and a s agent •
nan

AC128.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at
My Commission E x p i r e s :

-•..->-
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ADDENDUM 4

}' H 0 C £ h I) J N G S
THE COURT:

The Court, having previously listened to

proffered i.es t i niony, sworn testimony, having considered
numerous documents and exhibits,, having listened to argument
ansei, having considered carefully all of the documents
submitted in counoitjon with this matter,» rules as fo] lows:
The Court makes the following fundings of fact.

The 1974

agret'mMnt between Hi-Countrv Estates Second and Bagley and
Company was only an agreement uw convey riqht, title and
interest m
document < it

the disputed water system, ami not a deed or legal
« onveyance.

Two, the

, »*• nent did not convey legal right,

t it le or interest
ompany from Hi C
inc

the disputed water system to Bagley and
*

Estates Second

HJ-Country Estates,

held righ1", title and lnt^t-psi in the disputed water

system.
Three, Plaintiff, Hi-Country Homeowners1
Association, obtained legal right

title and interest in the

disputed wcMer system from the following sources:

Ar

i'wo i9/5

quitclaim deeds from Hi-Country Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country
Estates Second, to Plaintiff, Hi-Country Hompowners1
Association, iliose deeds conveying all common areas in the
Hi-Gountry Estates subdivision to plaintiff homeowners,
B, a 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake County to
Plaintiffs, conveying all the water tank lots In the disputed

1

1

subdivision to Plaintiffs.

2

C, a 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country Estates,

3

Inc., to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to

4

Plaintiffs.

5

D, a 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country Estates

6

Second to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to

7

Plaintiffs.

8
9

E, two 1985 recorded quitclaim deeds from Zions Bank
and Trust, trustee for the property in Hi-Country Estates

10

subdivision, to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to

11

Plaintiffs.

12
13

F, an assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc., to
Plaintiffs, of the disputed water rights.

14

6, an acknowledgement by the State Engineer's

15

Division of Water Rights that the plaintiffs are owners of the

16

water rights, more specifically the Pleasure well water

17

rights.

18

Based on the findings, the Court rules as follows:

19

Plaintiff is the legal owner of the disputed water system,

20

which includes the water rights, the water lots, the water

21

tanks, and the water lines.

22

virtue of several legal and equitable principles, is entitled

23

to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made by Defendant

24

to Plaintiff's water system from 1974 to 1985.

25

hearing is ordered to establish the amount of reimbursement

Defendant Bagley and Company, by

An evidentiary

due to Defendant from Plaintiffs

n,o counterclaim by

Foot:*! i i • Li Water Company is dismissed for lack
order quieting t „i t ,"i -.• to the water system
Plaintiffs, will issue only upon payment
+t

" an

; ; i "i^

f

by Plaintiffs

- the Court's reimbursement order for

improvements by the Iteieudant in the Plaintiffs' water system
ror the years 1974 tin \9uh
Plaintiff will prepare specific findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a court order, consistent with
rilinq ol the Court
court for signatur

All documents are to be ::*r\ --^

-e
*o this

- filing with the Clerk of the Court on

or before November

<•-,*•• T? ni

A little unasked for advice.
ahead, in terms of costs

You may be far, far

i m e competing interests

were to meet, and in an attitude c. compromise determine, by
stipulation, what is fair and reasonable in terms of
compensation to the defendant for improvements made to the
water system.

If you are unable to do that, the Court will

schedule an evidentiar
decision on the

-. m g , take testimony, and make the

raattei

appears that good judgment and

common sensp dictates that a* this point the question of
reasonable reimbursement

determined by the parties.

MR. ANTCZAK
there a chan e t«
of fact?

1 will

.
:-

-

,u

thing, **

^f^ extension on the findings
.

* the week preceding

3

that.
THE COURT:

On business or pleasure?

MR. ANTCZAK:
in Hawaii.

On business, I am afraid, though it is

I am told I can have no fun while I am there.

THE COURT:

I understand.

The Court is not going to

interfere with any pleasurable business trip.

When would you

like it?
MR. ANTCZAK:

One week would be just fine, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

The findings of fact, conclusions of law

and the order consistent with the ruling of the Court are to
be submitted on or before 12 noon, November 11, 1988.

Will

that give you enough time for your business trip?
MR. ANTCZAK:

I am sure it would.

MR. BENTLEY:

I assumed I would have the

responsibility, as Plaintiffs1 Counsel, to prepare those,
THE COURT:

You prepare them.

Apparently Counsel

wants to review them.
MR. BENTLEY:

So those should be to him by the 11th?

And then I assume you would have reasonable time for
objections?
THE COURT:

They should be to him in time for

Counsel to review them and have them submitted to this court
on or before November 11 at 12 noon.
MR. BENTLEY:

There are other issues you haven't

4

addressed, such as the counterclaims, attorney s le.-:^
issues.

other

Are those to be i eserved?
THE COURT: The Court is go a ng t:i LaKt under

advisement: a 1 1 other issues, with the hope that at th is point
those matters will be resolved with the umbrella issue of
i easonable reimbursement,

If not

Court will resolve those matters.

at a fut lire hearing, the
Does that cause anyone any

heartburn?
MR

fcNTCZAK:

Sounds fine, your Honor.

MR. BENTLE'Y :
THE COURT:

That' s f ine .

The Court will d< :> :i t , HI that basis,

To

matter does not slip in the cracks, t:i: le Court.

make sure,

on its own, motion, will 1 se t t :i le matter for an evidentiary
hear: g November 22, 1988, 10:00 a.m

this court.

If the

matter is resolved by stipulation, the Court would appreciate
notice at the earliest possible ;.* •

cnat tr. - * matter can

be suucbcen, and other matters waiting in the w.; ..;-

- be.

inserted into that t:i me spai : e .
MR

BENTLEY:

We have a number c >f documents that are

going to neea tr be examined, your Honor,
20

With that sort of

time frame, there obviously isi i1"11 room for discovery

I

21
wont ien if it might be appropriate to give us a nrenear Lug
conference date or discovery cutoff date to exchange documents
23
tnat are going to be used?

We havf U F W r seen any of the

2document.;.:* niaf would be used to support these capital
25

improvements.
THE COURT:

It is probably not going to take you

long to prepare them and submit them, is it?
I don!t believe so, your Honor.

MR. ANTCZAK:
frankly will have to —
documents.

I

Mr. Marsh's client has many of those

We need to work in conjunction with him.

Obviously Mr. Marsh is not here today.
THE COURT:
move with dispatch.

The Court is concerned that the matter
The November date will remain in place.

If it appears that after due diligence that just is not a
realistic date to complete the preparation for either
compromise or the evidentiary hearing, notify the Court, and
the Court will be understanding.
MR. BENTLEY:

Can we have an earlier date that is a

cutoff to introduce all exhibits that are going to be used, so
we can have a chance to look at them to determine if we need
expert testimony at the hearing?
going to be faced with.

I don't know what we are

If we had ten or 15 days prior to

that hearing an idea of all the exhibits, the breadth of the
testimony, who that was going to come from, it would be far
easier for us to prepare for an expedited hearing.
MR. ANTCZAK:

We will attempt to put it together as

expeditiously as we can.

But, as I indicate, we do need to

coordinate with Mr. Marsh and his client.
documents are under his control.

Many of the

I can't make a commitment to

6

1
2

the Court ox Mr, Bentley I oda^ on 'h=it issue*
THE COURT:

Today is Octobei

;5.

The Court- t«y way

3

of suggestion, did n t order, suggests that all do uirents be

<-

provided to counsel for the plaintiff on or before 12 noon,

t

November I"

1

others who are intimaft

tven It you are out of t mn

Jith the documents could begin the

process of assembling them,
t

i ounsel, maybe

(Tin* proceeding was concluded.)

